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The Trouble with Utility
In this issue of Academic Quarter, we focus on the concept of utility. 
References to utility are ubiquitous in both practical and theoretical 
settings. One of the most widespread ways of arguing for the initi-
ating of or holding on to a certain practice or activity is that it is 
useful to us, and appeals to utility are a common and important ar-
gumentative move in theoretical discussion. One reason why we so 
often invoke claims about utility is because the concept of utility is 
a fundamentally normative concept, as seen in the standard dic-
tionary definition of the term, i.e. ‘the state or quality of being use-
ful’. This normativity provides utility claims with their justificatory 
force. However, the term utility is frequently employed without 
specifying the framework providing utility with its normative pre-
tensions; in such cases, we use utility as if it is a purely descriptive 
term, and it comes to appear as if questions of utility are purely 
factual questions. In this way, the normativity of utility is not justi-
fied or challenged, but simply axiomatically enforced. Often, we 
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seem to be more preoccupied with asking if something is useful or 
not, and how useful it is, rather than asking ourselves why some-
thing is regarded or promoted as useful. The consequence of this 
somewhat muted discourse is that we might experience discom-
fort with the term and with what it promotes, simply because we 
are not in agreement with its implicit or pre-established norma-
tivity. At the same time, we lack a platform to express and address 
this disagreement within a particular discourse.
It is possible to argue that this problem of indeterminacy was 
present even in the introduction of utility into the modern philo-
sophical tradition. Of course, we find references to utility through-
out the philosophical tradition. However, utility only comes to 
take centre stage with Jeremy Bentham’s establishment of the 
foundation of utilitarianism in An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation. This is a theory that – across the various 
fields of human life – defines right action, the action that is to be 
done, as the action which succeeds in maximising utility for hu-
man beings. In Bentham’s work, the question of the nature of util-
ity appears as if it is clearly determined. Being a classical hedonist, 
Bentham thought that the measurement of utility was to be found 
in the fact that “Nature has placed mankind under two sovereign 
masters, pleasures and pain” (Bentham 1781/2000, 14). That is, he 
understands utility as that which maximises pleasure and mini-
mises pain and this allows Bentham to give a nice and neat defini-
tion of what he terms ‘the principle of utility’: 
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which 
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever ac-
cording to the tendency it appears to have to augment or 
diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in 
question. (ibid.)
Nonetheless, even if this way of approaching utility appears neat 
and definitive, problems arise almost straight away. At the bottom 
of the very first page of his book, Bentham goes on to elaborate that 
utility is a property of an object whereby it “tends to produce ben-
efit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present 
case comes to the same thing)” (ibid.). The problem is that even de-
spite Bentham’s reassuring parenthesis, benefit, advantage, pleas-
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ure, good and happiness really does not, or at least not in many 
cases, come to the same thing. 
The problems of determining the normative grounds of utility im-
plicit in Bentham’s work, becomes explicit in the work of his philo-
sophical heir, John Stuart Mill. Mill uses the term and the principal 
of utility in various ways throughout his life. Most famously, com-
menters note and debate whether the term is to be understood in a 
quantitative or in a qualitative manner, following an idea of pleasure 
and pain being of intrinsic value, i.e. the quality of valuable in them-
selves, and all other actions, activities etc. having extrinsic value, i.e. 
in quantity adding or subtracting to the intrinsic value of pleasure or 
pain. Adding to the debate is also the potential disharmony between 
Mill’s claim of the greatest happiness principle and his well-known 
remark “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satis-
fied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Mill 
1867, 14). Some commenters are keen on claiming that Mill’s usage 
and comprehension of utility is dependent on the particular topic 
which he addresses, others try to make a coherent understanding 
possible by claiming that Mill uses utility as a complex concept, 
which consist of different variables which can be combined in differ-
ent ways (Ebenstein 1985). At the end of the day, Mill’s indetermi-
nacy, but perhaps at the same time also quite balanced idea, can be 
summed up in the following quotation from On Liberty: “I regard 
utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be 
utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of 
man as a progressive being” (Mill 1989/1859, 33).
This last Millian move can claim some justification. After all hu-
man beings have many diverse and different interests, and many 
things can thus be considered of utility. However, this also leaves 
us without any transparent and coherent understanding of utili-
ty, and this, amongst other things, moves many moral philoso-
phers in the 20th Century to abandon utilitarianism in favour of other 
moral theories, mainly focused on conceptions of the good, but also 
haunted by problems of indeterminacy much similar to those aris-
ing with regard to utility. One could ask why philosophers make 
such efforts to determine the normative framework and justifica-
tion of utility. Why not simply instead accept that it is a heteroge-
neous term that involve a large number of very different concerns? 
There are however at least two problems with relying on a pre-
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sumed silent agreement about the nature of utility in particular cas-
es. The first is that no such agreement may exist – the philosophical 
discussions can be taken as an indication of exactly this fact. The 
other is that without a clear understanding of utility, we risk – with-
out actively choosing to do so – simply to accept and conform to a 
given normativity without any critical questioning. That is, we may 
come to legitimise, promote and/or excise choices or practices, 
whose underlying normative credentials we are unaware of, and 
which we would not endorse or would even disapprove of, if we 
came to understand them properly. 
Utility Today
The indeterminacy inherent in the understanding of utility that has 
haunted philosophy can also be found in in references to utility in 
public discourse. This would not be a problem, if such references 
were rare, but this is definitely not the case. If we wish to endorse or 
justify a particular behaviour, initiative or change, utility is a superb 
concept to apply. We find references to utility in discussions on pri-
orities in the health care sector, in regard to the purpose and struc-
ture of education and educational institutions; utility is invoked as 
a valuable variable in employment politics, in textbooks on organi-
sational change and leadership, in endorsement grants for the arts 
and the sciences, and in the numerous cost-benefit analyses deci-
sion-makers and debaters relay on each and every day.  Also in our 
private lives, utility is present as a principle, a variable or simply as 
justification. We use the concept when we plan our activities, when 
we make choices and when we judge on matters at hand, whether 
it is a question of preparing dinner, buying a second car or not, 
dressing our children in the morning or making a choice of sup-
porting a particular charity or non-governmental organisation.  
However, these employments of utility can be problematic. Be-
cause in each and every case, the meaning and reference of utility 
may be taken for granted and perfectly well accepted, but when we 
look across different cases, we find that utility can come to denote 
almost anything. The problem is here that as utility travels across 
cases and discourses, it may take a particular meaning or conceptu-
alisation with it from one area into a new one. We see this when 
particular practices or initiatives are being promoted as utile, be-
cause conducive to economic growth, in areas where the concern 
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for increasing wealth may not be our primary concern, such as kin-
dergartens or the arts. Here, we need to make explicit the underly-
ing normative understanding of utility in order to be able to discuss 
whether economic growth is a justified concern with regard to early 
childcare or artistic excellence. Another frequent problem is that the 
object of utility is left unspecified. If we for example argue that a 
shift from a focus on care to a focus on rehabilitation in nursing 
homes would result in increased utility, we need to specify, whether 
utility here concerns the inhabitants of the nursing home, the staff 
or the budget – or whether it is a lucky case where it is useful for all. 
Finally, the horizon of utility claims is often unclear. What may give 
an increase in utility right now, may not contribute to utility in the 
long run. 
These and similar problems of specification are always potential-
ly present when invoking utility claims. This gives cause for a strug-
gle to establish the meaning and reference of utility, which in turn, 
as in some cases, may lead to altering the originally positive evalu-
ation of the normativity of utility into a negative one. At the end of 
the day, we, just like the philosophers, get confused about utility, 
and become uncertain of how to use and how to regard the concept. 
But at the same time, we cannot seem to escape it or avoid it, and 
we certainly cannot seem to be indifferent to its forceful nature.  
An Issue of Utility
The pervasiveness of references to utility in all areas of life and the 
problems inherent in such references are our motivation for making 
utility the central theme of this issue of Academic Quarter with the 
hope of helping to further a much-needed discussion of the nature 
and uses of utility. These expectations have not been disappointed: 
the articles of the issues address the notion of utility from a wide 
range of perspectives, and they all address the issue of how to han-
dle the slippery nature of utility.
In the issue, we have ordered the articles in three overall groups, 
according to their way of treating the subject matter of utility. First, 
we have a group of articles written from the perspective of a theo-
retical position on utility. In Freedom of Expression in the Era of the 
Privatization of Reason Henrik Jøker Bjerre elaborates on the use and 
role of free speech. Taking his departure in Kant and Mill, free 
speech is set in a liberal tradition of public reason, which allows its 
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normative force to be linked to the utility it brings to the progress of 
society. Bjerre when addresses the contemporary discussion of free 
speech in an attempt to utilize the same liberal tradition, looking 
closer at populism and other forms of collective or shared speech. 
Søren Engelsen is concerned with practical reason in his article 
Emotioners (u)nytte En fænomenologisk analyse af emotioner i praktisk 
rationalitet. Through a phenomenological approach, Engelsen shows 
that emotions play a vital role in practical judgment, and he argues 
that instead of overlooking or disregarding this emotional compo-
nent, we should instead make best use of it, seeing the positive cog-
nitive potential of emotions as well avoiding their possibly dis-
torting influence. In this way, the article focuses on the utility of 
emotions. The last text in this group is Patrik Kjærsdam Telléus Dis-
covering utility between the descriptive and the normative. Telléus looks 
closer at the concept of utility as it is understood by Mill in his Util-
itarianism. Here, he emphasises Mill’s thoughts on moral reasoning 
in the sense of a virtuous character, but as such, the role of facts also 
play a vital part of moral reasoning. Bringing the concept of utility 
to a more general concern, Telléus uses his reading of Mill to claim 
that moral concepts, like utility, simultaneously inhabit both a de-
scriptive and a normative nature.    
Next is a group of texts that addresses the uses of utility in practi-
cal discourses. In the article, e-learning in the digital age. The utility of 
the entrepreneurial self, Birte Heidkamp and David Kergel investi-
gate claims about the usefulness of e-learning in contemporary 
literature and argue that the discussion is guided by a neoliberal 
understanding of utility in learning. Here useful learning is that 
which fosters important skills, understood as that which helps de-
velop the learner according to a neoliberal ideal of an entrepre-
neurial self. Our understanding of utility of educational methods is 
also the topic of the next article by Diana Stentoft, Tensions and co-
existence. Exploring multi-facetted articulations of intentions of problem-
based learning in higher education. Here, Stentoft identifies how the 
intentions behind and the understanding of the utility of problem-
based learning are diverse and possibly incompatible. Simultane-
ously, PLB is being promoted because it supports learning situa-
tions, because it furthers important skills and because it ensures the 
societal usefulness and employability of learners. However, these 
intensions may conflict, and this leaves unanswered the question of 
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whether we introduce PBL for the benefit of the students or for a 
wider societal interest in employable human resources.  Finally, in 
The utility of psychiatric diagnosis: Diagnostic classifications in clinical 
practice and research in relation to eating disorders, Gry Kjærsdam 
Telléus addresses the issue of the use and abuse of psychiatric diag-
nosis. Kjærsdam Telléus argues in support of the diagnostic system, 
claiming its usefulness for clinical practise as well as psychiatric 
research. The case of eating disorders provides an illustrative exam-
ple, and distinctions between popular and professional uses and 
attitudes toward diagnosis, and between the validity and the utility 
of diagnosis, are drawn in order to enhance the understanding of 
the practise of diagnosis.    
Our last collection of contributions gathers around an intercul-
tural perspective. Utility might for some appear as a purely western 
concept, due to its apparent relation to the economical and socio-
logical thinking and development of our modern western societies. 
However this idea is challenged by the investigations and clarifica-
tions we find in this final section. Prem Poddar, in The Uses of Kau-
tilya’s Arthashastra, discusses the interpretations and influences of 
the 4th century BCE Indian philosopher Kauitilya on modern west-
ern writings on statecraft, especially the ideas of Amartya Sen. Pod-
der traces both similarities and deviations, and by that he adds to 
the comprehension of an intercultural history of ideas, and simulta-
neously illustrates the complexity of the utilitarian roots and princi-
ples in modern welfare states. In Den lille og den store nytte – et in-
terkulturelt perspektiv på forholdet mellem nytte og frihed, Jesper Garsdal 
and Michael Paulsen also look eastward, and elaborate on connec-
tions between western and eastern philosophies, that are stronger 
than traditionally articulated. By way of classical Chinese philoso-
phy, Garsdal and Paulsen look closer at the modern Chinese phi-
losopher Yan Fu’s translations of western philosophy, and especial-
ly his reading of Mill. Creating this ‘dialectic hermeneutics’ enables 
a reading of utility in, what the authors call, a small version and a 
large version. By connecting to a similar analysis of the concept of 
freedom, an argument for a cultivated balance between harmony 
and conflict is established.
It is our hope that the reader of this issue of Academic Quarter will 
find inspirations for further reflections and, not to forget, uses of the 
unquestionable questionable concept of utility.     
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